On September 11, 2001, most Americans became aware of Saudi Arabia for the first time. Fifteen of the nineteen highjackers of American airplanes came from Saudi Arabia. Americans wanted to know who these people were and why they attacked us.

I believe there are several factors that came together to produce not only the attacks, but also the development of terrorism internationally.

Extremist Fundamentalism

The Saudi state arose through a combination of military success and a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. That interpretation, practiced by groups known variously as Wahhabi, Salafi, Wahidi, is a strict one. It defines the correct practice of Islam to be that practiced by the Prophet Mohammed, as laid down in the Quran and the Hadith, paying little attention to interpretations made later in the history of Islam.

This interpretation puts the mainstream Saudi Sunni Muslim at distinct odds with the Shi’i, who formed shortly after the death of the Prophet. It also leads them to see Sufism as a heresy for its pantheistic tendencies. Specific religious rites and rituals performed by Shi’i, Sufi and others—such as the veneration of tombs and relics, ornamentation, and music—are anethema to these fundamentalists.

One of the tenents of Saudi fundamentalist Islam is that not only should the good be promoted, but that evil should be actively countered. This countering extends beyond merely stopping evil. It implies that people should be protected from what Catholics know as “occasions of sin”. Thus, the “religious police” not only prevent people from sinning, but seek to remove any temptation toward sin. This is what leads to the strong segregation of the sexes in public, their prohibition of smoking—the prohibition of alcohol is basic to all forms of Islam.

This fundamentalism has its problems, particularly in the ways in which it circumscribes individual freedoms. It runs counter to contemporary standards of human rights in the way it treats women and the way it limits religious freedom.

Its greatest danger, I believe, lies in the way it dehumanizes any who do not agree with it. This leaves the interpretation far too open for even more abusive conduct, and extremism. It is one thing to believe another beneath contempt—that is bad enough. It is far worse, though, to abuse or kill him for it.

The Quran is a very complicated document. Unlike the Jewish or Christian holy books, the Quran is not arranged chronologically; it does not tell a coherent “story” with a beginning, middle, and end. This makes it difficult to tell where or when a particular quotation belongs. Analysis of the text has been able to separate the different chapters or suras into two broad categories, those originating while Mohammed was in Mecca and those from when he was in Medina. Some suras can be linked chronologically by their subject matter. But it remains difficult to know whether a particular sura is it a comment about a specific historical event, or is it a general exhoration toward a certain type of behavior?

It is historically clear that after a warm welcome in multi-ethnic Yathrib (as the city of Medina was then called), Mohammed and his followers faced increasing friction with the Jews of the city. From a period of friendship and cooperation, the relationship changed to one of enmity. Two Jewish tribes were driven out; a third was massacred.

Some see the suras that describe this as historically bound: this as a specific action, taken at a specific time, in response to specific behavior by the Jewish tribes. Others see it as defining—for all time—the relationship between Muslims and Jews. This, of course, is the view taken by many fundamentalists and all extremist fundamentalists.

The Saudis refer to people like Usama bin Laden as takfiri, “one who calls another fakr, or “non-believer”. By putting the other outside the realm of Islam, one makes him an enemy. There is a strong tendency toward this in Saudi Arabia. It makes up the absolute trump card in any argument, effectively ending any and all discussion.

Education:

Another factor, I think, was an error made nearly 50 years ago, as the country was taking its first steps toward development. Coming from a desert, tribal society with no infrastructure, Saudi Arabia realized that it needed schools to develop. It could build the physical fabric, the buildings, but it had no teachers. Teachers needed to be brought in as expatriate labor.

Finding teachers was problematic. The country was not an attractive place to live. Most building were constructed of mud, or at best coral blocks. There was no running water, no sewage system, no air conditioning, very little electricity. Potential teachers were not lining up to be hired.

There were groups of people who were available, however: religious ultra-fundamentalists (Muslim Brotherhood, Deobandis) who were being threatened with prison or death in their own countries in the face of rising nationalism, particularly in Egypt and Syria, Pakistan and India. Because they were being persecuted for their fundamentalist Islamic beliefs, it was somewhat natural that the Saudi government found it easy to employ them. The government believed that it could trust the education of Saudi children to people who were strict in their interpretation of Islam.

The Saudis got more than they bargained for, though, as these ultra-fundamentalists—with the support of the Saudi ulema—set the tone for an exceptionally narrow education that demonized any but the most fundamentalist beliefs.

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan:

The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was, on the part of the Soviet Union, a political act. It was undertaken for several reasons, none of which had to do with religion.

Following a UN resolution condeming the invastion, and as part of its Cold War strategy to inhibit Soviet expansion, the US, with some of its Western and Middle Eastern allies, decided to fight. The United States was not willing to make a full-scale committment of American troops to the region, but actively sought alliances with “natural enemies” of the Soviet Union. Foremost among these were the strongly Islamic states in the region and on the Persian Gulf. Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were among the first approached.

Islam and Communism are diametrically opposed. The Pakistani government, for both political and religious reasons did not want a Soviet client on its borders. The Saudis saw the conflict between religion and atheism as absolute.

I believe a terrible error was made. Never, in my opinion, should religion be recruited as a means toward secular ends. Secular governance relies on reason as its motivating engine; religion relies on faith, which need not always be rational.

The United States alone provided over $2 billion to help throw the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Pakistan provided both intelligence assets and manpower. Saudi Arabia provided funds for military hardware and for humanitarian relief, and, critically, a large number of young Saudis eager to fight as jihadis.

The 10-year war in Afghanistan was not centrally directed. Those countries involved developed relationships with various tribal factions throughout the country. Military activities were rarely, if ever, coordinated, though they were united in a common cause. Thus it is that—contrary to some opinion—the US did not work directly with Usama bin Laden’s organization.

In the end, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1988. They left behind a political vacuum that was soon filled with warring factions, each seeking ascendency. After years of civil war, the Taliban—an extreme fundamentalist group—ended up on top. Their radical interpetation of Islam was to provide a hospitable environment for Al-Qaeda in the late 1990s.

Usama bin Laden:

There have been many books written about Usama bin Laden, theorizing how the son of a successful Saudi businessman became the world’s most notorious terrorist. All probably have something to bear on the story, but the fact is that no one other than bin Laden himself knows for sure.

We are sure that at some point in his life he moved from belief in a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam to an extreme fundamentalist position. The deciding moment may have been the take-over of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by a group of armed Mahdists. This group, followers of a heterodox, milennialistic strain of Islam, believed that the Messiah was to come when certain signs were seen. These signs—the name of the Mahdi or Messiah, birthmarks, name, age, origin, and the like—seemed to come together in the person of Juhaiman Al-Otaybi. A group was formed around him and, on November 20, 1979, they took over by force the Grand Mosque, where the sacred Kabba is located.

A siege of the mosque ensued. By the time it was over, hundreds of people had been killed, including the supposed “Mahdi”. His supporters who survived the siege were executed publicly; their wives received prison sentences; their children were put into foster care.

The seizure of the Grand Mosque shook the country to the core. Not only were strict taboos about the shedding of blood within the confines of the mosque shattered, but the legitimacy of the ruling Saud family was brought into question.

That year also saw the culmination of the Iranian Revolution. There, Shi’a religious fundamentalists were able to seize power from the Shah who had been seen as secular, actively anti-Muslim, drawn more to the glories of “pagan” Persian than Islamic Iran, and thoroughly corrupt personally. The demonstration that fundamentalist religion could overthrow a government protected by a large, professional army encouraged other Islamic fundamentalists around the world.

It is certain that the first Gulf War—Desert Shield & Desert Storm—was a major event in the radicalization of bin Laden. Through mutual agreement between the US, Saudi Arabia, and the numerous members of the alliance, large numbers of foreign troops gathered in Saudi Arabia. These troops were, in part, Muslim, but were mostly non-Muslim. Worse, among them were women.

No matter the accommodations made to take into account cultural sensitivities, bin Laden saw the mere presence of non-Muslim forces on the ground as an affront to Islam. He interpreted their presence as an assault on the sacred lands that could be rectified only by their removal. In the end, even that was not enough, however.

In 2003, following the end of major military operations in Iraq, the US and Saudi Arabia mutually agreed that the international forces which supported Operations Southern Watch were no longer necessary. Operation Southern Watch was set up to interdict Iraqi aircraft movements in soutshern Iraq, where Saddam Hussein’s army and air force had been visiting devastating damage to the Shi’a majority. Once Hussein was removed, the threat no longer existed. Thus, the need for alliance planes to be based in Saudi Arabia no longer existed. The end of the operation was announced on April 30, 2003. Similarly, Operation Northern Watch, which served a similar protective mission over northern Iraq, was concluded on May 2, 2003.

The end of US military presence in Saudi Arabia, however, did not satisfy bin Laden’s goal. Clearly, while used as a rallying cry, it was not his real goal.

Bin Laden’s arguments against the presence of “infidels” in the holy lands are also factually challenged. The country of Saudi Arabia did not exist until 1932. Previously, there was the brief “Kingdom of the Hijaz and of the Nejd and its Dependencies”; earlier than that, separate kingdoms/sheikhdoms for each of the many regions that comprised “Arabia”. So what constitutes the “land of the two holy places”? An argument can be made that the “holy places” are exclusively Mecca and Medina, two holy cities from which non-Muslims are prohibited. But the city of Jeddah, for instance, has always had non-Muslim residents, as have various cities along the coast of the Eastern Province. No “infidels” have occupied Mecca or Medina.

Equally, bin Laden’s call for resolution of the Israeli/Palestinian dispute is a late addition to his list of causes. Likewise, his concern for Iraq.

Bin Laden’s true cause seems to be eschatological: the rebirth of the Islamic Caliphate, the return of Spain to the Islamic fold, and the universal ascendency of Islam.

Undeniably, the message of Usama bin Laden is attractive to many Saudis. It accords, generally, with their fundamentalist view of the world. His interpretation of Islam, however, goes beyond fundamentalism, beyond Wahhabism/Salafism, into a real of heresy that is unacceptable. It has taken some time for the Saudi ulema to realize that, but it appears that finally they have.

Copyright 2004-2007 Crossroads Arabia