I’m mostly back from my trip to Saudi Arabia. I won’t return home until Sunday, Feb. 5, at which time I’ll be back to full-time blogging.
I was very happy with my trip. I met with a wide range of contacts, including some new ones. I was particularly happy to learn that my optic on Saudi Arabia was still accurate, with nothing major having changed without my notice. I’ll be writing about different aspects of the trip over the coming days, but to put it succinctly, Saudi Arabia is indeed on the road to reform. Major changes have happened and are continuing to happen. Saudis believe that King Abdullah is intending to continue reforms and they support him for the most part.
The war on terror within the Kingdom is being won, but it’s far from over. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been severely degraded; senior leadership has been killed off and large quantities of materiel have been seized. The government has strongly gone after not just the terrorists, but those who support it, be they goverment officials, private citizens, or preachers.
Economic changes have all been for the better of late. The steps the country took to qualify for accession to the WTO have opened many doors, not only to private investors–the Saudi stock market is insanely active–but the private competitors I learned from Saudi businessmen. I met with young Saudi women in Jeddah, all of whom were happily employed in jobs they wanted to do, though they had some ideas about how things could be improved.
I also met with some young male Saudi bloggers in Riyadh. They, too, were gainfully employed, happy with the jobs and prospects.
Meeting with a former religious extremist–now an analyst of Islamic fundamentalism–I learned that because of the opening of the economy, many would-be extremists are now too busy making money to bother with the philosophical side of things.
At the US Embassy, I heard that American officials working the issues of Saudi cooperation in fighting terrorism–and the funding of terrorism–are on the whole very happy with the level of cooperation. They do not understand criticisms of Saudi cooperation because they believe there are very few areas in which the Saudis are not cooperating fully. Where there is less than 100% cooperation, there are compelling reasons why not. They also note that the USG holds Saudi Arabia as the model to which other Arab Gulf States should aspire in their own controls.
Some things were not great about the trip, though. Foremost among these was the level of security surrounding US governmental installations in the country. There is so much security that it is reaching the point where it interferes with the ability to actually do work. More about this and the rest later.
I’m glad to have gone and I’m glad to be back.
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February:03:2006 - 18:44
What are the “compelling reasons”?
February:03:2006 - 18:44
Free-Markets Approach to Fighting Terrorism
If a young man is gainfully and engagingly employed, perhaps…
February:03:2006 - 18:44
In this regard, the compelling reason is domestic politics. If the Saudi government is viewed by the Saudi populace is marching to the West’s (or America’s) tune, without any difference, then the government loses legitimacy. It’s not prepared to do that lightly.
The issue at hand is whether or not the international charities should be monitored from the headquarters, in the KSA, or in the various countries in which they actually work. The latter is the Saudi position and makes sense, to an extent. The US position is that some of these countries are truly third-world countries, with incompetent bureaucracies, and thus unable to do proper monitoring.
The issue is still actively being argued between the US and the KSA.
February:03:2006 - 18:44
If the Saudi government is viewed by the Saudi populace is marching to the West’s (or America’s) tune, without any difference, then the government loses legitimacy.
Paradox! As long as American diplomats defer to such attitudes and hand out goodies or favors based on the “we-can’t-stay-to-close-to-America” attitude, American diplomats discourage and neuter the influence (and careers) of pro-American officials, and even legitimize official anti-Americanism. The American diplomat may receive a short-term boost to his career, but the U.S. may suffer the consequences of losing out long-range strategic objectives.
Don’t give in, and pro-American officials may gain influence - and thus step up the career ladder. The primary function of Public Diplomacy should be to encourage attitudes in the target populace that make standing with America not just conceivable, but something that should be actively favored.
As for international charities in the Muslim World: too many of them have been compromised not to have multiple checks and balances built into their monitoring systems. Even then it becomes a question of Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
February:03:2006 - 18:44
I didn’t say this was being ignored, just that it was not being given top billing as a critical issue. Every time someone from Treasury repeats the fact of the problem–to the media, to a congressional committee–the pressure is kept on.
But there’s a matter of degree involved here. Not every issue or every detail of every issue can be go-to-the-mat. If everything is important, then nothing’s important.
One can–and State Dept. does–prioritize. It says, “We’re not happy with the way you’re monitoring the international charity groups. We understand you can’t/won’t just follow our dictates, but we still expect to see progress. Find another means to meet the end and we’ll be happy, but you’ve got to reach the end.”
Prioritizing issues means that some matters will get more attention and some will get less. “Democratization”–more realistically, what the USG is looking for is actually an increase in representation, not necessarily democracy–is getting the major attention as nearly all we’ve asked in countering terror financing is already being done.
February:03:2006 - 18:44
Every time someone from Treasury repeats the fact of the problem–to the media, to a congressional committee–the pressure is kept on.
I understand about pressure from Treasury. Perhaps the system from ~25 years ago would have been superior: Treasury (and Commerce) would have sent their own officials. Sure, State would sacrifice some control - but if you are made to serve another bureaucracy there may be no way to ever satisfy ‘em; there is always something that needs more clarification, some point that could have been made, something else they can say should have been done differently. It is no skin off their nose to apply pressure, and their priorities aren’t yours.
Might not State do a better job if it concentrated on keeping track of things (policy coordination) rather than controlling them?
And how did supervision of NGOs/charities become a PD issue, rather than a political one? Let me guess: everybody else was busy so it got dumped on the shoulders of the new PD man: “He just came over from USIA, he has nothing important to do…”
Setting priorities is tough. Congress wants to “earmark” their own. The bosses have their own ideas. The “core” responsibily - who advocates that?
But there are only a handful of PD officers in KSA. Trying to do everything would seem to guarantee doing at least some things poorly. (What I heard that Treasury did when they were faced with a similar situation was to testify to the relevant congressional committee, quite frankly, that they were not going to obey Congress because Treasury lacked the time, funds, and will to do the task demanded by law. The congressmen choked a bit but Treasury got away with it.)
February:03:2006 - 18:44
I’m not sure how you’re reading that this is a PD issue. PD isn’t “supervising” the NGOs/charities. That’s a matter for a number of anti-terror financing task forces. And Treasury is very much its own player here. They have their own officers in Riyadh with their own channels of communication. They are most tightly tied to the FBI on a joint task force with the Saudis; State isn’t a player on that task force.
Treasury does, of course, coordinate with State, but State doesn’t set the agenda nor does it control the message. Policy is set, government-wide, by the White House. State and Treasury are both supposed to be supporting that policy, using their individual areas of expertise.