Arab News runs a couple of articles today on Arab media—particularly that of Egypt—and how they performed in last week’s revolution in Cairo. The Egyptian media, does not fare well; Al-Jazeera, on the other hand, did quite well for itself.
In this piece, disillusionment with the local media is the theme. That media simply made itself irrelevant because it was not reporting anything close to the truth, a truth that was readily visible on the streets and through international media, whether satellite TV or YouTube videos.
For Egypt’s media, a time to reflect
SOMAYYA JABARTI | ARAB NEWSCAIRO: A few feet from Tahrir Square on Kasr El Nile Bridge Sunday morning, a girl overheard my question posed to a man regarding Egypt’s national media.
“I’ve always wanted to be a reporter, even before the revolution,” she interjected.
“Have you changed your mind?” I asked.
“No,” she replied. “I still want to be a reporter. Not here, though, but for Al-Jazeera. They tell the truth!“
Meet 13-year old Huda Ibrahim, who, like so many Egyptians, looks to the foreign media for the truth. Even before the Jan. 25 protest movement began, Huda and her family have disregarded the news on local TV channels and newspapers. The inaccuracies of the local media’s coverage of the protesters, which have been exposed by the foreign media, has re-enforced this negative public sentiment.
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Another article says that the Egyptian people have had enough of state-owned media and their less-than-honest coverage of Egyptian politics. With a reformulation of the Egyptian government forthcoming, it would be a good time to simply get rid of the useless Ministry of Information. States simply cannot control the flow of information anymore. Attempts to continue to do so are not only certain to fail, they are certain to create additional anger against the state.
Egypt starts cleaning up muzzled press
SOMAYYA JABARTI | ARAB NEWSCAIRO: Protesters gathered Sunday morning in front of the offices of the government’s Al-Gomhuria newspaper, which was accused of bias and selective reporting in favor of ousted President Hosni Mubarak during the first days of the protests.
The editor-in-chief of the newspaper was prevented from entering the premises by his own staff. A similar incident occurred with Al-Ahram newspaper, which is also state owned. Both papers have since made significant shifts in their coverage in the opposite direction.
There has also been widespread criticism of the Egyptian Ministry of Information, describing it as an anachronism that polices the media. Protesters have scoffed at Mubarak’s statement before he stepped down that he would allow freedom of expression.
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Saudi Gazette has a brief blurb on a new book by Lawrence Pintak running on its front page. Pintak’s book’s title describes itself: The New Arab Journalist: Mission and Identity in a Time of Turmoil. While I don’t always agree with Pintak on all issues, he is, without a doubt, an acute observer of Arab media and the way it is changing.
On the subject of changing Arab media on the whole, don’t forget to check in at the Arab Media & Society website from time to time. It’s frequently updated with a variety of reports, some more academic than others, but usually interesting.
While this is only ‘a first rough draft of history’, so to speak, this Associated Press piece running in Asharq Alawsat takes a look within the Mubarak regime as it was reaching its final days. The article has lots of sources, unfortunately unnamed, so it’s hard to tell what is self-serving narrative and what could be considered ‘factual’ in any objective sense. It does, however, present a coherent story of a group trying to deal with a crisis while avoiding much in the way of responsibility. Sheltering the boss from bad news seems to play an inordinate role in the story; surrounding oneself with ‘yes men’ another—those are rarely steps toward succes in any event.
Mubarak’s final hours: Desperate bids to stay
CAIRO, (AP) – Hosni Mubarak was supposed to announce his resignation on Thursday. The Egyptian military expected it. The new head of his ruling party pleaded to him face-to-face to do it. But despite more than two weeks of massive demonstrations by protesters unmoved by lesser concessions, the president still didn’t get it.
Mubarak’s top aides and family — including his son Gamal, widely viewed as his intended successor — told him he could still ride out the turmoil. So the televised resignation speech the rest of Egypt had expected became a stubborn — and ultimately humiliating — effort to cling to power. It only enraged protesters. On Friday, the military moved decisively.
On Saturday, insiders in Egypt gave The Associated Press an initial picture of what happened in the hours before Egypt’s “unoustable” leader of nearly 30 years fell. Some of them spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the information.
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Just for a change of pace, I’ll draw your attention to this piece from The Economist‘s language/linguistics blog, ‘Johnson’. It ponders how Hosni Mubarak’s name can be turned into a verb. It’s easy in English, but more complicated in Arabic, as the article (and comments) explain. The biggest question, though, is just what such a verb might mean…
Okay, Hosni Mubarak is now in the history books. But history has not ended; it continues its movement, 24-hours by 24-hours. What comes next for Egypt and what comes next for the region? Arab News certainly doesn’t know.
There’s a lot of speculation—and speculation it can only be. The Egyptian Army is in control. Will it willingly give up that control? The Army is not entirely a neutral participant in the political picture of Egypt. The last three Presidents were all from the military, certainly not by accident. According to this story from American National Public Radio, the Egyptian military is a major player in the Egyptian economy, controlling anything up to 40% of it. What’s bad for the Egyptian economy is also bad for the Egyptian military. And for individual Egyptian military officers. Will they be keeping their eyes on their personal bottom lines while making decisions about the future of the country?
Others point out that for at least the past 2,500 years, Egypt has been the crossroads or even the target of foreign intervention, if not conquest. Has geography changed somehow to make this dynamic defunct? Or will Egypt always be pressured by neighbors, near and far, to move in particular ways? Many have made much of Egyptian weakness. Can Egypt develop the strength to assert itself, to define and defend itself? Today’s Egypt is not that of yesterday. It is filled with smart young people who seek to recreate Egypt into a modern state. But Egypt is also home to significant poverty, illiteracy, and a tendency toward looking inward, at itself, with a fatalistic sense of kismet.
What about the foreign relations of the state aborning? Will the ‘new’ Egypt acknowledge existing treaties and understandings? International law requires it to abide by treaties formed by an earlier government in most cases, at least until new treaties are formally arranged or old one formally abrogated. This, obviously, is of concern to Israel, the US, the EU, and others. So far, the Egyptian Army says, ‘Yes’. How about the government that forms when the Army steps out of the limelight?
And what of the region?
Were I a ruler in a nearby state, I’d be taking a look at how my government was running things—and I don’t mean ‘how quickly I can disrupt the Internet’. I’d be looking to see how and how effectively I was replying to the needs and demands of youth, the largest portion of my population. Are my programs to provide them with a future working? Do they believe they have a future within the status quo? If not, then the status quo needs to change, and rapidly at that. Risks may have to be taken, even by risk-averse rulers. If nothing else, channels through which youth can speak about and participate in governing their own futures need to be opened. Some cherished, traditional eggs are going to have to be broken, but that’s a better alternative than breaking heads.
Stability in a state and in a region are good things, generally speaking, but stability is not stasis. Modernization cannot take place without change. How that change happens is controllable only to a limited extent, though. It can be controlled within a stable environment only so long as that environment is dynamic. And societies are dynamic, caught in the currents of history. Seeking to halt the spinning is like thrusting a stick in the middle of a turning engine. Yes, it will halt the momentum, but usually with the engine exploding as the result.
There are now calls for Mubarak to be put on trial and the moneys he’s assumed to have misappropriated to be ‘returned to the people’. How much traction that idea gets, and how much the Army is willing to support it, will determine what happens next. If a process is established to bring him to trial, then Interpol warrants will follow.
I’m betting that Mr Mubarak will find himself and his family a new residence in Jeddah soon.
That’s it… he’s stepped aside and transferred power to the Army.
Vice President Suleiman, on state TV:
“In the name of God the merciful, the compassionate, citizens, during these very difficult circumstances Egypt is going through, President Hosni Mubarak has decided to step down from the office of president of the republic and has charged the high council of the armed forces to administer the affairs of the country. May God help everybody.”
Again, Egypt is roiled as a message and the messenger are found unacceptable by the people. Outside powers find themselves less than charmed by what they consider to have been a deceptive, if not deceitful interpretation of what was going to happen. The US calls on him to be ‘clear and unequivocal’; the Danish Prime Minister says, ‘Mubarak is history. Mubarak must step down’. And now, after Friday prayers, tens of thousands are again on the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, Tanta, Ismalia, and Suez. This time, the Cairo marchers have expanded from Tahrir Sq. and now stand outside the state TV headquarters and the presidential palace in Heliopolis, both activities that ratchet up the anxiety levels. Meanwhile, the Egyptian Army, guarantors of peace, stand by…
Saudi media express their surprise at Pres. Mubarak’s speech. Many around the world, including US CIA Director Panetta, had been led to believe that Mubarak was to announce his resignation. Perhaps he did, but in such an unconvincing way as to leave the world scratching its head and shaking it in dismay at the same time.
Arab News runs constantly changing headlines as the situation develops. It reports on the inadequacy of Mubarak’s speech. Oddly, it also features several opinion pieces, as this one from Princess Reem Al-Faisal, that hearken back to colonialism, its evils and consequences, and see current events as the final shrugging off of its effects. Another points out that it’s again ‘Cool to be Arab.’
Asharq Alawsat carries a Reuters story stating that the Egyptian Army is stepping in to effect changes promised by Mubarak last night. Al-Arabiya TV is reporting that Mubarak has left Cairo; Israeli Haaretz says he’s in Sharm al-Sheikh; BBC says ‘foreign officials’ are confirming this; FOX News covers it as well..
The BBC and Al-Jazeera have running, live commentary on their sites.
What does it all mean? Well, first of all, Mubarak did not accomplish what he expected through his speech. It was mostly counter-productive. He has created a situation in which heightened anger in the streets is likely to come to a head this weekend. What will the Army do? There are some (unverified) reports that mid-level military officers are joining the masses. If sufficient numbers do, then we might get a new announcement sometime soon. Would this constitute a coup? Not exactly within the normal definition of ‘coup’ as it would be a popularly supported act. Some argue that a coup has already taken place, quietly and behind the scenes, with the Army now driving things and struggling to calibrate its responses and the speeches it ‘encourages’ senior civilian officials to deliver.
Bottom line? I think Mubarak will be stepping down, sooner rather than later. Saudi Arabia is a short helicopter jaunt across the Red Sea.
Live, streaming reporting from Al-Jazeera TV, via YouTube.
Various international media are reporting that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak will be departing his office tonight. While Egyptian government sources are categorizing this as ‘rumor’, other sources are saying that Mubarak will announce his resignation in a speech to the nation tonight.
What happens if this story turns out to be true or it it is rumor bears watching, of course. There are no road maps.
UPDATE: Clearly, the answer is not now, at least peaceably. Let’s see what tomorrow brings, at the Palace…
Here’s an interesting piece in Asharq Alawsat from Mshari Al-Zaydi. He writes about how media—including Arab media—become polarized in their viewpoints as they become ever more powerful in the reach. He comments on the fact that governments find themselves having to negotiate with media outlets as they once negotiated with governments. He cautions that this might not be the best thing for anyone.
The Media War in Tahrir Square
Mshari Al-ZaydiThe Arab media divides into two camps over every important event, with each camp becoming entrenched in their views and people following the dictates of their convictions – and occasionally their raw emotions – which is something that varies according to the changing information.
Do you recall the 9/11 attacks? In the beginning there was a sense of joy and elation with regards to America suffering this blow, and then positions began to form and solidify, and the position of people in the Arab and Islamic world divided into [opposing] teams.
Currently the Arab media – both newspapers and satellite channels – has again divided over what is happening.
This is something that has occurred over more than one hot topic during the first decade of the new millennium, from the war in Afghanistan to the war to topple Saddam Hussein to Hezbollah’s wars to the Gaza war and then the events in Sudan, the Tunisian revolution, and finally the protests in Egypt.
Why does the Arab media divide over events such as these?
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The New York Times carries this special report from Reuters on the state of Saudi education and how it is failing its students. It notes that reforms have been made, but that they’ve not been major. Even these reforms, though, will take at least 10 years to show any effect. Much will depend, the writers conclude, on how future Saudi leaders address the problems of education.
Special Report:
In Saudi Arabia, A Clamor For EducationJEDDAH (Reuters) – Saudi teenager Abdulrahman Saeed lives in one of the richest countries in the world, but his prospects are poor, he blames his education, and it’s not a situation that looks like changing soon.
“There is not enough in our curriculum,” says Saeed, 16, who goes to an all-male state school in the Red Sea port of Jeddah. “It is just theoretical teaching, and there is no practice or guidance to prepare us for the job market.”
Saeed wants to study physics but worries that his state high school is failing him. He says the curriculum is outdated, and teachers simply repeat what is written in text books without adding anything of practical value or discussions. Even if the teachers did do more than the basics, Saeed’s class, at 32 students, is too big for him to get adequate attention. While children in Europe and Asia often start learning a language at five or six, Saudi students start learning English at 12. Much time is spent studying religion and completing exercises heavy with moral instruction. One task for eighth grade students: “Discuss the problem of staying up late, its causes, effects and cure.”
In the face of rising unemployment, Saeed has taken parts of his education into his own hands. He learned how to use the internet on his own and sets himself research projects in his own time to try to make up for his school’s shortcomings. “The subjects available are not enough to carry us to the career or specialization that is needed for the job,” he complains.
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The story today is about Middle Eastern leaders cautioning the US to go slow in sanctioning change in Egypt. Various media outlets are spinning the story to match their editorial lines (for example, FOX News leads with the angle that Saudi Arabia would step in to replace US aid if the US were to cut it). The New York Times has a more rounded piece saying that it’s not just the conservative Gulf States who are concerned about the pace of reform in Egypt, but Israel and Jordan, too. Each may have its own reasons for preferring a slower pace of change in Egypt, but cumulatively, they add up to a call for patience.
Allies Press U.S. to Go Slow on Egypt
MARK LANDLER and HELENE COOPERWASHINGTON — As the Obama administration gropes for the right response to the uprising in Egypt, it has not lacked for advice from democracy advocates, academics, pundits, even members of the previous administration. But few voices have been as urgent, insistent or persuasive as those of Egypt’s neighbors.
Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates have each repeatedly pressed the United States not to cut loose Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak, too hastily, or to throw its weight behind the democracy movement in a way that could further destabilize the region, diplomats say. One Middle Eastern envoy said that on a single day, he spent 12 hours on the phone with American officials.
There is evidence that the pressure has paid off. On Saturday, just days after suggesting that it wanted immediate change, the administration said it would support an “orderly transition” managed by Vice President Omar Suleiman. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said that Mr. Mubarak’s immediate resignation might complicate, rather than clear, Egypt’s path to democracy, given the requirements of Egypt’s Constitution.
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Words of caution aren’t only coming from the region. David Mack, a scholar at the Middle East Institute [disclosure: I know David; he was my DCM when I was in Tunis] has a piece for Foreign Affairs magazine’s website:
Hold the Applause Revolutions like Egypt’s most often end badly
The question, really, is ‘After Mubarak, what?’ For that, there are no particularly good answers just now…
The British daily The Guardian, in its continuing reporting on WikiLeaks, runs a piece in which a Saudi questions whether Saudi ARAMCO has been truthfully reporting its oil production potential. This has led to a flurry of coverage from both environmental and ‘peak oil’ prognosticators, as well as those who just like bashing Saudi Arabia.
WikiLeaks cables: Saudi Arabia cannot pump
enough oil to keep a lid on prices
US diplomat convinced by Saudi expert that reserves of world’s biggest oil exporter have been overstated by nearly 40%
John VidalThe US fears that Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest crude oil exporter, may not have enough reserves to prevent oil prices escalating, confidential cables from its embassy in Riyadh show.
The cables, released by WikiLeaks, urge Washington to take seriously a warning from a senior Saudi government oil executive that the kingdom’s crude oil reserves may have been overstated by as much as 300bn barrels – nearly 40%.
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I’ve got some problems with this story…
First, I cannot find the cable itself at any of the sites mirroring WikiLeaks. It’s not on the WikiLeak.org site, either. Without seeing the text of the cable, it’s hard to assess its worth. I note that the Saudi source, Sadad al-Husseini, was a former Saudi ARAMCO employee—not, as the article state, an ‘official’. How long ago did al-Husseini leave his position as head of exploration? The cable itself, Guardian says, dates back to 2007. What was the context of the meeting at which the issue was discussed? Who was the American reporting officer? The article says ‘Consul General in Riyadh’. The Consul General in Riyadh is responsible for, well, consular affairs, that is, visas and the like. The embassy in Riyadh has an Economics Officer whose brief is Saudi oil. Is the reporting officer competent to assess al-Husseini’s comments? There’s also a Consul General in Dhahran, next to ARAMCO, whose entire office has Saudi ARAMCO within its brief. Why isn’t the cable coming from there? I can assume that someone in the Economics section looked at the cable before it was sent, but with the rapid turnover of officers that was going on in 2007—six-month tours of duty—I’m not sure of it.
In sum, I really do want to see the full cable. If any readers find a link to it, I’d appreciate your passing it on.
UPDATE: I’ve yet to find the full-text cable, but commenter ‘Balqis’ sent a link which in turn linked to this piece from Wall St. Journal:
Saudi Oil Reserves and
the WikiLeaks Chinese Whispers EffectAngus Mcdowall
At first glance it looked like a story to shake the world: the WikiLeaks cable suggesting Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves -– the most bountiful on the planet -– may have been overstated by 40%.
It opened the door to a future in which oil would be depleted far more quickly than anybody believed -– raising the threat of sky-high prices and cut-throat competition for scarce resources.
But a conversation this morning with the man whose comments set off the furore revealed a Chinese-whispers chain that ended up giving the apparent imprimatur of the U.S. diplomatic service to a misunderstanding over oil figures.
The story starts back in 2007 when U.S. diplomats had a chat with Abdullah al-Saif, head of exploration at Saudi Arabian Oil Company, commonly known as Saudi Aramco.
He told them that the kingdom had 716 billion barrels of oil –- a figure that would rise to 900 billion in about 20 years.
Enter Sadad al-Husseini, a predecessor of Mr. al-Saif as Saudi Aramco’s exploration head, and pretty much the only company insider ever to speak in public. In the past he has been skeptical of some Saudi forecasts on how much oil it can pump and is regarded within the industry as a careful, knowledgeable man.
Asked by the American diplomats what he thought of Mr. al-Saif’s statements, he made what appeared an extraordinary statement: that the reserves figure was inflated by 300 billion barrels. Deducting that figure from the 716 billion barrels created the idea that Saudi reserves were 40% less than it officially said.
As it turns out, however, Mr. al-Husseini’s memory of that conversation is rather different.
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And here is the cable. I see no reason to question Mr al-Hussiein’s later remarks.