Comments on: UPDATE: Chas Freeman and the National Intelligence Council

By: John Burgess

John Burgess — Tue, 17 Mar 2009 11:55:07 +0000

I do it to point out that there are truly double standards at play here. Donations from some countries seem to be just fine; those from others are taboo. I am particularly concerned that any sort of relationship with certain countries in the Middle East is deemed ‘corrupt’ based on little logic and enormous amounts of emotion and prejudice.

Now clearly there are some bad players out there, countries whose activities should be looked at skeptically. I do not believe the gov’t of Saudi Arabia is one of those.

By: ratherdashing

ratherdashing — Tue, 17 Mar 2009 03:39:21 +0000

John,

Thanks for shedding light on the think tanks and their bias and funding and how this whole foreign relations thing works at ground level.

By: Consul-At-Arms

Consul-At-Arms — Tue, 10 Mar 2009 15:16:14 +0000

I’ve quoted you and linked to you here: http://consul-at-arms2.blogspot.com/2009/03/re-chas-freeman-and-national.html

By: Krista

Krista — Fri, 06 Mar 2009 22:35:19 +0000

Hmm, I can’t even pretend to know anything about this, but in my opinion anyone who strongly represents one side or the other will not be fair and unbiased (Israel or the Arabs). On that alone I’d say he’s a poor choice for head of an intelligence council.

By: Solomon2

Solomon2 — Fri, 06 Mar 2009 18:40:49 +0000

As I understand it, the NIC provides a framework through which one interprets intelligence information. As his writing on China demonstrates, Mr. Freeman is liable to “tunnel vision”, by seeing events through the eyes of Realpolitik. Gone from his analysis is any consideration that Zhao Ziyang might have shown “restraint” not just out of “sympathy”, but as a matter of internal party politics, specifically his desire, with Hu Yaobang, to re-shape China to be more capitalist under his liberalizing leadership. By imposing a “realpolitik” view, Freeman seems to have missed the meaning of the event: hard-line elements were willing to adopt the economic reforms, but not the political ones, and retain ultimate control of development themselves – specifically, keeping internal provinces communist, providing a reliable source of recruits to Party Organs.

China would become capitalist but remain authoritarian – that’s what it seems Freeman would have missed had he been NIC director in 1989, for he might have dismissed Tianamen’s import as a mere police matter with little or no lasting political impact (as the WWI veterans 1932 Bonus Army march on Washington was.)