Most of the analysis of King Abdullah’s shakeup of the Saudi government has been positive, seeing it as a major reform in the direction of increased tolerance and dialogue. Some, for whatever reason, see it only as a ‘snow job’, an effort to sway foreign public opinion without actually doing a thing to change the nefarious plotting to take over the world. I won’t be giving any links for the latter point of view, but they can be found easily enough if you’re interested.
Three pieces that do warrant attention, though. I recommend that you read them in their entirety.
Stephen Schwartz, a vocal critic of Saudi Arabia—though he doesn’t particularly understand it well and conjures evil with the name ‘Wahhabi’ —writes at Weekly Standard that the changes seem real. Schwartz still can’t get his facts right: The religious police are not volunteers, they are government employees; ‘Qatif Girl’ was not punished for being raped, but for the preceding crime of khulwa; King Abdullah is not an ‘absolute’ monarch as he is constrained by the power blocs that Schwartz does recognize; etc. He nevertheless finds the reforms ‘promising’:
Shaping Up Saudi Arabia
Stephen SchwartzSaudi Arabia may have finally begun its long-predicted turn toward significant reform, as reported over the past weekend in Gulf media. King Abdullah ibn Abd Al-Aziz has effected a series of major decisions that could impose a dramatically new and modern direction on the kingdom.
Abdullah has appointed the Wahhabi-dominated society’s first female deputy minister, Nora bint Abdullah al-Fayez, a former teacher trained in the United States, to direct a newly established official department for women’s education. That was the most impressive news out of Riyadh on February 14. The elevation of a Saudi woman to a deputy ministerial position represents a major break with ruling habits in a land that still does not permit women to drive automobiles–although 80,000 Saudi women own cars–or to travel without a family member or chaperone.
King Abdullah further placed reformers in charge of the ministries of justice, education, information, and health. Naming a woman deputy minister and emphasizing women’s training are giant steps forward. But Saudi authorities must also make education useful to graduates–rather than emphasizing obscurantist religious topics–and, of course, must completely remove the hateful and violent doctrines of the ultra-fundamentalist Wahhabi sect from the schools.
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Writing for the Dubai-based Gulf News, Jumana Al Tamimi focuses on the potential for educational reform resulting from the shakeup. She identifies—correctly, in my view—the Saudi education system as the root of Saudi Arabia’s current problems. Beneath that, and still of critical importance, is ‘tribal culture’ that needs to be adjusted through education.
Long expected changes to education in the Kingdom finally materialise
Jumana Al Tamimi, Associate EditorDubai: It was shortly after 9/11 attacks, when the Saudi society came under the Western microscope.
Since then, calls started to pour on the Kingdom to introduce changes in many aspects of daily life, including school curriculum, and to be more open with the rest of the world.
The changes were needed to repair the image of the oil-rich kingdom abroad, distorted by the fact that the majority of the attackers were Saudis.
Some westerners and Saudis blamed the terrorism on the “narrow-minded” education system which they said had failed to keep up with other field advancements in Saudi society.
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Perhaps the most thoughtful analysis to date is that of Simon Henderson, writing for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. I find some of the Institute’s analysis to be shaded toward Israeli political points of view, but here, I think Henderson correctly sees the shakeup for what it is: a major effort to move Saudi Arabia out of the backwaters of the 21st C.
Saudi Arabia Changes Course, Slowly
Simon HendersonOn February 14, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia announced a range of new ministerial, legal, and bureaucratic appointments. Surprising in scope and timing, the changes include the appointment of the kingdom’s first woman as a deputy minister and were made, according to Labor Minister Ghazi al-Ghusaibi, “to speed up implementation of new educational and judicial reforms.” The realization of such reforms remains questionable given the traditionally glacial pace of administrative change in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, further advances could be blocked by more conservative and religious forces.
Abdullah’s First Reshuffle as King
Arguably the most significant appointment is that of Prince Faisal bin Abdullah bin Muhammad — who comes from a branch of the royal family with no direct claim to the throne — as the new education minister. (The woman appointed, Nura al-Fayez, will be a deputy education minister, in charge of girls’ affairs.) Prince Faisal is regarded as progressive, and he founded a think tank studying the reform of higher education. Until his appointment, he was a top leader in the Saudi foreign intelligence service and, before that, a senior officer in the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), the praetorian guard commanded by King Abdullah for more than forty years. But Prince Faisal’s principal significance is that he is married to the king’s daughter, Adila, giving his policy initiatives important backing. Princess Adila has strong views of her own, being one of the few Saudi princesses with a semipublic role and a known advocate of women’s right to drive. (The kingdom is the only country in the world where women are not allowed to drive.)
Apart from Prince Faisal, other associates of King Abdullah also figure prominently in the changes. The new health minister is Abdullah al-Rabia, who has been in charge of health at the SANG but is better known as a surgeon who has separated several conjoined twins. Another new deputy minister of education is Faisal al-Muammar, who was secretary-general of the National Dialogue Center, the principal mechanism used by King Abdullah to allow public — albeit tentative — debate of contentious issues in the kingdom. The new head of the Saudi Human Rights Commission is Bandar al-Aiban, a former member of the consultative council (majles al-shura) and before that a SANG officer attached to the Saudi embassy in Washington.
Team Abdullah
King Abdullah, who turns eighty-six this year and is reportedly limited in his abilities, is probably best described as the sponsor rather than the architect of these changes. But he is allowing a group of close advisers to develop ideas and policies that are, in Saudi terms, pushing the envelope of political and social progress, even if by regional standards the measures seem minimal and overdue. Crucial advisers around the king include Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, Labor Minister al-Ghusaibi (a poet and writer on the side) and Khalid al-Tuwaijri, the secretary-general of the Allegiance Council, the so far untried mechanism announced in 2007 for confirming the appointment of future kings. Another is Saudi ambassador to the United States Adel al-Jubair, who seems to spend as much time with the king as he does in Washington.
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February:19:2009 - 11:30
First to Swartz “leather sticks” come on now man. I haven’t seen any of those nor any stores to purchase such.
Overall good shakeup but I think “We can it up shake it up baby now” in terms of six months from now lets see what progress has been made and assess it.
In the Article by Jumana Al Tamimi…this is what I was thinking in reaction to Fatin’s being quoted.
Fatin Bundagji: “An internal awakening was recorded [afterwards]& The country was shocked that 15 out of 19 attackers were from its sons.”
Sparky: “Shocked” really???
Fatin Bundagji: Millions of Saudis were also “victims” and now it is the time to “fix” things, she said
Sparky: Victims of the explosive nuclear fallout figuratively speaking as a result of actions by a handful or victims of a system that creates attackers?
Bundagji: Developing the education system requires a successful partnership between students and teachers as well,” Bundagji said. “It will not happen today or tomorrow.” Yet, “a time-table” to introduce changes is certainly hoped for, Bundagji said.
Sparky: If not today or tomorrow, how about “baed bukra inshallah”
Baed bukra asaan min “ma araf mita”
Translation or transliteration:
“baed bukra” = the day after tomorrow God Willing
“asaan min ma araf mita” = better than I don’t know when
February:19:2009 - 12:22
>>‘Qatif Girl’ was not punished for being raped, but for the preceding crime of khulwa <<<
Kind of. She was punished for being raped after committing khulwa. Just as this other girl recently in Jeddah was punished for being gang raped at a rest stop after committing khulwa. They don’t punish women for committing khulwa — they punish them for getting into trouble by committing khulwa. Otherwise the prisons would be filled with women who committed khulwa alone.
And, actually, they’re punished for getting into trouble by committing khulwa as defined as an unrelated man and woman together in a car, which is only considered khulwa in Saudi Arabia as particularly unpleasant pockets of radicalism in the border region of Pakistan and in Somalia.
It is not consider khulwa in Islam in general except perhaps in a few other places where the the Church of Wahhabi has polluted the minds of Muslims in other places, like in Southeast Asia.
February:19:2009 - 12:32
I don’t think you need lay this double standard at the feet of the ‘Church of Wahhabi’. The indigenous ultra-conservatives have managed to create it for themselves, globally.
The court in Qatif did not sentence Qatif Girl to punishment for having been raped, but for the preceding crime. The crime, however, left her in a situation in which the crime of rape (for which the attackers were tried and convicted) was possible. I’m sure the judges, to greater or lesser extent, believed ‘She had it coming to her’. They did not, however, record a verdict against her for that. As for the Jeddah incident, there is so much information missing from that story that I’m not ready to give much of an opinion about it.
February:19:2009 - 12:48
How will the social costs of these reforms be handled? I suppose there will be bureaucrats made redundant, students who may become angry at what the have to learn and unlearn, and those who expected to get a job or have a career under the previous system who can’t expect the same job or influence under the new.
February:19:2009 - 13:20
I think the social costs of doing nothing–i.e., the status quo–grossly outweigh those of reform. Indeed, there will be some discommoded by change, as there always is. Saudi university and high school students, however, are already being marginalized by their inferior educations. Some might be angered by this, but most will see it as getting a better deal. As for the bureaucrats and clerics… well, give them a nice pension and let them spend more time with their families.
For the would-be extremist clerics, well there’s always Afghanistan, Yemen, and Guantanamo…
February:19:2009 - 13:51
OK perhaps cutesy ‘Church of Wahhabi’ didn’t sound right, but this extremism arising in Asia seems to be clearly related to the export of the austere brand of Saudi Islam. The Muslims in the Philippines weren’t plotting to blow up commercial aircraft over the Pacific because of “indigenous ultra-conservatives.” That kind of stuff seems to leads back to some indigenous ultra-conservatives either having spent time in Saudi Arabia or having been indoctrinated by a Islamic society funded, built and maintained by Saudi orthodox “charitable” interests. To the Saudis credit they recognize this now and are hopefully rectifying it. But I don’t see much in the history of Islam in Southeast Asia that points to this being spontaneously generated there. The millions of Asian that cycle through Saudi Arabia as workers, as well as efforts of certain Saudi organizations and radicals (not all, of course) have contributed to this. I know an Indian Muslim guy who thinks that everywhere you see a burqa in India, there’s a Saudi-funded mosque nearby.
February:19:2009 - 14:16
For the would-be extremist clerics, well there’s always Afghanistan, Yemen, and Guantanamo…
So ultimately the idea is that social cost of dealing with the extremists should be borne by sacrificing the lives of non-Saudis? No confrontations with domestic critics, just show them the exit?
February:19:2009 - 16:24
I thought Guantanamo was officially shut down…
Here is the link of Obama officially directing the shut down of Guantanamo dated Jan 22, 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/us/politics/22gitmo.html?_r=1
February:19:2009 - 17:24
The price charged by fanatics is born by their targets, wherever they find them. That can be fanatical Saudis or fanatical Basques.
Fanatical Saudis do pay a price, when they’re caught or killed. I’m not sure what you’re asking that falls on this side of 1984-mind reading or “Minority Report” preventive detentions/executions. The Saudi government has been clearing out the mosques and classrooms and the latest changes indicate they’ll be doing more of it. I’m sure they’d welcome helpful suggestions!
February:19:2009 - 17:26
The directive says, “within a year”. I suspect that the reality of the problem will lead to that deadline slipping. Even if it is accomplished, there’s still going to have to be some place where bad guys are held when they can’t be released and their home countries (if any) don’t want them back.
And to support my view that I have some clue about American politics, I find this from Reason Magazine: Obama Plans Indefinite Military Detention of Terrorism Suspects. It might not be Guantanamo, but it’ll be somewhere.
February:19:2009 - 17:33
I think the brew-pot where today’s fanatics got their start was Afghanistan in the 1980s. It brought together the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi extremists (Wahhabis, if you must), and home-grown Indo-Pakistani Deobandis of whom the Taleban were the hosts. The mixture brought the worst elements of all into one noxious combination that has poisoned not just the actors themselves, but the next generation.
We do know that charities funded by Saudis (Saudi charities or other) were frequently used as fronts to fund terrorism and extremism. The Saudis, both government and society, were incredibly careless in tracking their donations, simply believing those that said they’d do good things with the money. That loophole has been largely closed, but not completely.
I’m not rejecting the thought that Saudi-funded and staffed schools and mosques played a role in radicalizing Muslims around the world. I just think that the importance of that role is exaggerated.
February:19:2009 - 19:03
I do not doubt your knowledge on any subject
I just thought that Guantanamo had become a politically incorrect term. Yes, there must be a place to keep the bad guys and glad to think Obama has some place in mind at least because I was worried for a while.
February:19:2009 - 19:37
Well, I doubt my knowledge on lots of things… that’s partly why I read so much. It’s also why I’m glad that there’s a World Wide Web, where I can learn dozens of new things every day.
February:21:2009 - 03:40
Afghanistan war, Israel, Kosovo.. Chechnya.. all these events helped create the Jihadist movements. Now those were battle fields.. the biggest change and also what separate Ibn Al-Khattab and Osama Bin Laden.. Al Khattab and Osama had a rift that separated even their followers. Ibn Al-Khattab believes Jihad should be in regions of wars against Muslims.. while Osama took Jihad to a Global scene in the form of terrorism.
February:21:2009 - 12:09
>> (Wahhabis, if you must) <<
I’ve noticed this aversion to the use of this term. What is the appropriate term then? Orthodox Hanfi Sunnis? I don’t want to get bogged down in semantics, but I also want to be accurate. (Such as the difference between “mutawwa” and “haya” that the Western media always mixes up.)
How I see it is this: When Saudis build a mosque in, say, Mindanao, the people who establish this local Islamic society advocate a “string” of Islam perpetuated by the 18th century resurgence of orthodoxy in Saudi Arabia. This advocacy is strengthened by guest workers who go to Saudi Arabia and bring home this interpretation of the faith, which seems to be conjoined with Arabian tribal customs.
Is this not a proper way of interpreting the phenomenon? That oppressed Muslim minorities in Asia embrace this austere strain of Islam?
February:21:2009 - 18:33
Saudis who fall into the group in question will accept ‘Salafi’ but prefer ‘Muwahhidun,’ ‘Those who profess the oneness of God’.
Both Wahhabi and Salafi carry a lot of baggage, some political, some theological. You really have to spend time figuring out just which section is under discussion.
Most Saudis are, in fact, ‘Wahhabi’, but in a far looser sense than those who wish to disparage the them use it. For those, ‘Wahhabi’ means ‘extremist’.
February:22:2009 - 10:36
Islam And The West Accelerated Links [02/22/2009]…
Crossroads Arabia with analysis of King Abdullah’s shake up of the Saudi government….