The Saudi Constitution: Planting the Seeds of a New Paradigm
Mshari Al-Zaydi

King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz’s royal decree to establish the Allegiance Institution Committee, with the special rules that govern it, to specifically control the process of selecting the king and the crown prince, ensures the unity of the royal family and safeguards the country. As such, Saudi Arabia has widened the circle of political trust and spread reassurance among its people, further stabilizing its constitution. This is the Saudi citizen’s first impression, or what an observer would record as the public reaction to the announcement.

Having said that, we may begin to address the clearly written constitutional ‘ceiling’ that controls the transition of power from one king to another. Although the ruling system under King Fahd in 1992 briefly addressed this subject, this new 25-article system takes into account more possibilities including ones of a rare occurrence such as the simultaneous incapacitation of king and crown prince, or simultaneous deaths. It has also introduced new terminology, enriching the Saudi political dictionary with terms such as ‘Transitory Ruling Council’.

Indeed, we may rest assured that even in the worst-case scenario wherein conflict and differences escalate around matters related to the rule that there exists a reference and a mechanism to set matters straight. There are clear and transparent legal articles that can resolve most anticipated cases without the customary discomfort; situations such as health disabilities or the incompetence of the nominated candidates for king and crown prince as stated in section ‘b’ of Article 7 of the decree, which states: “It is the king’s prerogative to ask the committee to nominate a crown prince at any time. In the case that the king does not approve of the committee’s nominations, in accordance with sections ‘a’ and ‘b’ of this article, the committee will vote between its nominated choice and another candidate nominated by the king. The crown prince will be selected on the basis of gaining the most votes. In the case of a draw, the king’s word overrules.”

Al-Zaydi looks at the changes to the Saudi ‘constitution’ and basically likes what he sees. He notes that the recent announcement of formal procedures to deal with succession are rooted in historical concepts, including the restriction of nomination of monarchs to a specific family; this is nothing new in European history, after all. In going back to early Islamic history—to the rule of the ‘Umayyad dynasty of ruler/caliph–he argues there is nothing demonstrably ‘wrong’ in such a situation, but also that times (and governments) do change.

His discussion of the role of ‘allegiance’ within Arab politics is also worth noting. A very good article.