In the Mideast, the Third Way Is a Myth
By Shibley TelhamiThe reality shown by Hamas’s victory in the Palestinian elections is this: If fully free elections were held today in the rest of the Arab world, Islamist parties would win in most states. Even with intensive international efforts to support “civil society” and nongovernmental organizations, elections in five years would probably yield the same results. The notion, popular in Washington over the past few years, that American programs and efforts can help build a third alternative to both current governments and Islamists is simply a delusion.
Good piece in The Washington Post today. Shibley Telhami argues that elections are not the end point of democratization, civil societies are.
He notes that under the current circumstances, any election in the Arab world will result in a victory by Islamists. That is because existing governments hold no appeal to citizens, he says. The Arab world is bipolar–ruling regimes or Islamists–with no “third way” present in any meaningful sense.
It’s necessary, I believe, to develop civil societies based on rule of law, transparency, and freedom of speech and the media before functional democracies can be developed. By pushing for elections as the be-all and end-all, we run a risk of electing people who don’t quite agree with the concept of continuing elections.
But it is possible–and the case of Hamas in Palestine will be closely watched–that an Islamist government will have to function as a government, not just an opposition party. That implies a more realistic approach to problems, far beyond rhetorical complaints about the status quo.
In Saudi Arabia’s elections for positions on municipal councils, the Islamists won as well. Now that they’re in place, how well they function will be a clear indicator of whether or not words can be put into action.
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February:19:2006 - 02:52
I think that their could be a third way, and perhaps a fourth – the third being a secular democratic opposition party like Salam Fayyad’s Third Way (what a coincidence) Party or the Wafd in Egypt, both of which got blown out in recent elections; the fourth would be a non-terrorist Islamist movement like the Wasat in Egypt, SCIRI and Dawa in Iraq and the ruling party in Turkey. But Iraq has Sistani; no other Arab country has such a towering authority who is pro-democracy, and Turkey’s history is so radically different from the Arab world that it isn’t much of a model. And Wasat, like the Wafd, got blown out in Egypt. But it could happen.
I agree with your arugment for the need for institutions before effective elections, but am skeptical of the theory that being in power moderates a terrorist. That hasn’t happened in Iran, didn’t happen to Turabi in the Sudan (he was thrown in jail), and Hizbullah is as staunch an ally of the Tehran-Damascus axis now as ever; Nasrallah was quoted in Al-Hayat a couple of days ago saying that Saad Hariri was bringing Lebanon to the point of civil war by opposing Syria.
February:19:2006 - 09:00
I agree with your point on finding other ways, and see SCIRI as a hopeful model. I think that the extremes will meet somewhere near the middle, if given adequate time. I’m not sure that there is adequate time, though.
Iran is the result of the ’79 revolution, a revoltion that I don’t think could happen in quite the same way–if at all–today, largely because of newer media. Sudan, too, is a historic case. Hizbollah, in its own way, is a remnant of the Iranian revoltion coupled with a Lebanese civil war and Syrian string-pulling. Not at all sure they are replicable now.
February:20:2006 - 02:55
I mention those three – Iran’s revolution, the Sudan, and Hizbullah – in order to cast doubt on the argument that radical Islamists will moderate once in power simply because they are the examples we have. It is true, as you note, that each involved circumstances rather unusual for the Arab world. One could point to the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, which is not in power but legal and participating in government – it is reformist, pragmatic, and essentially pro-Bin Laden. They stared off based on the philosophy of Abdullah Azzam, OBL’s mentor, and they have pretty much stayed that way. I could be wrong – perhaps, against all expectation, Hamas or the MB will turn out genuinely to moderate in power. But I doubt it, and the penalty for being wrong, allowing Hamas to fully entrench themselves in power, will be huge.
I think one clear lesson to take from Iran is that once an Islamist regime is in power, it doesn’t need to stay popular in order to stay in power.
And even with Iraq, one might argue special circumstances. I think that Sistani’s thinking was influenced by the repression of Saddam and because he could see the dissatisfation with repression in Iran, and SCIRI was influenced by that. Despite their radical-sounding name, SCIRI put up an apparently moderate candidate in Abdul Mahdi.
February:20:2006 - 10:27
I think, too, that you need to keep in mind the sectarian differences between SCIRI and Al-Badr’s groups. One’s Akbari Shi’a; the other’s ‘Usuli, as are the majority of Iranians.
The former group rejects, for doctrinal reasons, the mixing of religious and secular authority while the latter is nearly defined by it.
‘Usuli Shi’ism is poorly understood in the West, alas.